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Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Harmonizing Victim Confidentiality Rights
with Children's Best Interests
State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan'
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year almost two million women are physically battered in the
2United States. More alarmingly, domestic violence and child mistreatment
problems are often intertwined, causing additional millions of children to
suffer the effects of domestic abuse.3 Some states have begun to recognize the
serious need to address domestic violence and child welfare issues together
instead of as two separate, unrelated events in order to better protect both
mothers and their children.4 The first step for many states is to address stat-
utes that deal, on one hand, with permitting discovery of all potential in-
stances of child abuse where family violence is present, while balancing on
the other hand, the need to protect the battered mothers' rights to confidenti-
ality when they have sought refuge in domestic violence shelters.
In State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, the Missouri Supreme
Court examined Missouri Revised Statutes Section 210.140, 5 which elimi-
nates legally recognized privileged communications where there is evidence
of child abuse or neglect, and attempted to resolve it with Section 455.220,6
which establishes strict confidentiality for residents of domestic violence
shelters. 7 Although Section 210.140 has previously been the subject of litiga-
tion, this case was the first time the court concurrently dealt with Section
455.220 and attempted to harmonize two conflicting statutes that ultimately
could have a tremendous effect on the children involved. This Note will ex-
amine the potential impact of the court's ruling on battered women, their chil-
dren, and the shelters trying to help these victims. This Note will also weigh
the benefits and detriments of allowing victims' records to be kept confiden-
1. 133 S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
2. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
12 (2000).
3. Maureen K. Collins, Comment, Nicholson v. Williams: Who Is Failing to
Protect Whom? Collaborating the Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic
Violence Services to Better Protect and Support Battered Mothers and Their Chil-
dren, 38 NEW ENG. L. REv. 725,725 (2004).
4. Id.
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.140 (Supp. 2001).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.220 (2000).
7. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 46.
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tial, even when children are involved and the potential for child abuse is pre-
sent.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Maria Martinez left her two minor children at the New House domestic
violence shelter with a caregiver on September 8, 2002.8 Martinez did not
provide the shelter with any clue as to her whereabouts after leaving her chil-
dren.9 The children were placed in protective custody and a petition was filed
on their behalf in the juvenile division of the circuit court.'0 On November
25, 2002, the court ordered that the children remain in the mother's custody. "
Two days later, Martinez was evicted from the Rose Brooks shelter,12 at
which time she moved with her children into the New House shelter. 3 Marti-
nez remained at New House until she was evicted on December 9, 2002.1'
Martinez and her children then sought shelter at Hope House, until all three
were discharged from the facility on January 2, 2003.15 The Division of Fam-
ily Services was unable to discern why Martinez and her children were
evicted from the domestic violence shelters. 16
On January 14, 2003, the court held a protective custody hearing and de-
termined that the children should remain in Martinez's care. ' 7 Two weeks
later, the court held a dispositional hearing and ordered that Martinez would
retain custody of her children.'18 After this hearing, Martinez went to another
domestic violence shelter. 9 On July 28, 2003, the court held a hearing on the
juvenile officer's motion to modify the January 28th disposition, yet again
8. Id. Because Hope House was not a party to the original proceedings and the
underlying case has not yet been settled, many of the facts as to the juvenile matters
are not available and, thus, are not discussed in this Note.
9. Brief for Respondent at *4, State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133
S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en bane) (No. SC 85638).
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id. at *4. Although the children were returned to the mother's custody, they
were to remain under the supervision of the Division of Family Services. Id. The
court also stipulated that Martinez must participate in counseling at the Rose Brooks
shelter. Id. at *4.
12. Id. Martinez resided at the Rose Brooks shelter between the time she left her
children at the New House shelter and the court's ruling on November 25, 2002. Id.
13. Id. After being evicted, Martinez did not contact the Division of Family Ser-
vices social worker to let the worker know of her whereabouts. Id.
14. Id. at *4-5.
15. Id. at *5.
16. Id. at *13.
17. Id. at *5.
18. Brief for Relator at *5-6, State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133
S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en bane) (No. SC 85638).
19. Id. at *6.
[Vol. 70
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ordering the children to remain in Martinez's custody.20 The next day the
juvenile officer filed an amended motion to modify the disposition. 21 The
amended motion alleged that Martinez had failed to maintain stable housing,
as evidenced by her eviction from three shelters in less than three months, and
that Martinez had placed her children in harm's way by being involved in a
22violent relationship. The court had not yet held a hearing on the amended
motion at the time of the decision in Merrigan.2
3
On January 14, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum, ordering
Hope House to appear and produce records regarding the children and their
mother. 24 Martinez had never given Hope House written permission to release
25any records that the shelter may have had. Hope House filed a motion to
quash the subpoena on January 24, 2003, citing federal and state laws as the
"reasons for its inability to release records and/or provide any identifying
information regarding a Maria Martinez and her children., 26 The respondent,
Commissioner Molly Merrigan, denied the shelter's motion to quash the sub-
poena on June 11, 2003.27 Hope House then filed a petition for writ of prohi-
bition with Judge W. Stephen Nixon, the administrative judge of the Family
Court Division of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.28 Judge
Nixon denied Hope House's petition for writ of prohibition. 29 Hope House
then filed its petition for writ of prohibition with the Western Division of the
20. Id. The juvenile officer filed the motion to modify the disposition on Febru-
ary 4, 2003. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The motion specifically alleged that in June 2003, Martinez's ex-lover
came to her residence and held a knife to her throat. Id. It further alleged that the
children were at home at the time of the incident. Id. The motion also alleged that on
July 11, the ex-lover abused Martinez again, pushed one of the children into a car
door, and chased Martinez with a machete. Id.
23. State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d 44, 46 (Mo. 2004)
(en banc).
24. Brief for Respondent at *5, State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133
S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (No. SC 85638). Mary Anne Metheny, Chief Operat-
ing Officer of Hope House, Inc., was served with the subpoena. Brief for Relator at
*6-7.
25. Brief for Relator at *7.
26. Id. The juvenile officer filed an answer to the motion to quash on March 25,
2003, and filed its trial brief on May 15, 2003. Id. Hope House filed its response to
the juvenile officer's trial brief on May 28, 2003. Id.
27. Id. The court noted that the proper respondent in this case was Jackson
County Circuit Court Judge W. Stephen Nixon, not Commissioner Merrigan, and
directed the writ as modified toward him. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 46 n.2.
28. Brief for Respondent at *6. Relator filed this petition on June 16, 2003. Id.
On August 6, 2003, the juvenile officer filed an answer and motion to dismiss petition
for writ of prohibition. Id.
29. Brief for Relator at *7-8.
20051
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Missouri Court of Appeals on September 8, 2003.30 The court of appeals de-
nied its petition the same day without issuing any findings.31 As a final resort,
Hope House appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.32 The court determined
that Missouri Revised Statutes Section 455.220 does not constitute a legally
recognized privileged communication subject to Section 210.140; 3 3 therefore,
requiring Hope House to produce statutorily protected information would
constitute an abuse of discretion.34 Three justices dissented.35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA),36 the first federal act dealing with child abuse.37 CAPTA
"formulated the mandates for the development of a bureaucracy within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)... to gather informa-
tion and expertise on the problem of child abuse. .... 08 The Act also estab-
lished the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN), which
provided states with grant money to investigate and prevent child abuse and
acted as a clearinghouse of information concerning child protection programs
and research. 39 This grant money was only eligible for states enacting manda-
tory child abuse reporting laws that complied with certain requirements.40
Since 1974, these reporting laws have been expanded to include all
types of child mistreatment and require mandatory disclosure by many pro-
30. Id. at *8.
31. Id.
32. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 45-46.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id. at 50.
35. The dissent by Judge Limbaugh, joined by Judges Benton and Price, would
have quashed the writ, citing the public policy need to protect children through all
available forms of discovery as more important than protecting the confidentiality of
victim's records. Id. at 52. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
36. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. 93-247, § 2, 88 Stat. 5
(1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2000).
37. See generally Collins, supra note 3; Howard Davidson, A Model Child Pro-
tection Legal Reform Instrument: The Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
Consistency with United States Law, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 185 (1998); Susan
V. Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and Empowerment for
Domestic Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the
Foster Care System, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 69 (2001); Caroline Trost, Chilling Child
Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183 (1998)
38. Mangold, supra note 37, at 89-90. The former Department of Health, Educa-
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fessionals who work with children.4' These child abuse laws stem primarily
from society's desire to protect children, rather than from a general concern
about children's rights.42 Thus, the reporting laws override any ethical duties
to protect confidential information, including all privileged communications,
except those stemming from the attorney-client privilege.43 In 1996, Congress
completely revised CAPTA's confidentiality and disclosure requirements,
resulting in states' expanded discretion to decide when to disclose child abuse
reports, records, and other confidential information. 44 States must now dem-
onstrate that they have laws preserving the confidentiality of child abuse and
neglect records in order to receive CAPTA funding.45 Some experts recom-
mend that state agencies attempt to harmonize the need for maintaining con-
fidentiality and disclosing vital information by suggesting that "confidential-
ity should take precedence unless disclosure is necessary to further the goals
of child protection.46
B. Mandatory Disclosure and Missouri Revised Statutes Section
210.140
Missouri's mandatory disclosure statute is set out in Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 210.140, which states:
41. See generally, http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/manda.pdf
(last modified June 2003). Current statutes require that all people working with chil-
dren in a professional capacity report suspected cases of mistreatment. Id. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, physicians, other health care providers, teachers, and
child health care providers. Id.
42. Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Con-
fidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998).
43. JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 104-05
(1992).
44. ALICE BUSSIERE ET AL., SHARING INFORMATION: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS
ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FOR CHILD WELFARE
AGENCIES 7 (1997).
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id. at 10. Not all states are in agreement as to how to enact their confidential-
ity laws and apply them to child abuse or neglect situations.
Connecticut's and Pennsylvania's battered woman-counselor privilege
statutes have no exception for reporting child abuse or neglect. North Da-
kota's statute makes reporting and testifying optional if the counselor
deems it necessary to protect a child or if compelled to disclose by a court.
Several states, including Alaska, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire (the latter three where the perpetrator is being prosecuted
criminally), require the court to do a balancing test in camera, before rul-
ing on the admissibility of testimony or records.
Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of
Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 298-99 (1995).
2005]
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Any legally recognized privileged communication, except that be-
tween attorney and client or involving communications made to a
minister or clergyperson, shall not apply to situations involving
known or suspected child abuse or neglect and shall not constitute
grounds for failure to report as required or permitted by sections
210.110 to 210.165, to cooperate with the division in any of its ac-
tivities pursuant to sections 210.110 to 210.165, or to give or ac-
cept evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or
neglect.
47
Missouri courts have consistently applied this statute to cases involving
child abuse to allow privileged communications to be disclosed in order to
protect the children involved.
In 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Hoester48 extensively
examined the language and construction of Missouri Revised Statutes Section
210.140, concluding that in enacting the statute, the legislature had not in-
tended to limit its broad language. 49 The respondent, Judge Hoester, con-
tended that Section 210.140 removed the physician-patient privilege from any
judicial proceeding pertaining to child abuse or neglect, a statement with
which the court ultimately agreed.50
The court addressed each section of the statute separately, discussing the
particular meanings of each, so as to set a foundation for subsequent cases
that would also look to the language of the statute for guidance as to the legis-
lature's intent.5 ' The court held that the term "situations" included all in-
stances having civil or criminal implications but were not limited to either of
the two. 52 The court went on to determine that the legislature intended that
those who must "report" and "cooperate" under the terms of the child protec-
tion and abuse statutes could not raise the privilege in cases where sanctions
would be invoked, or reporting and cooperation with the division would be
required.
53
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the Hoester decision four years
later in State v. Ward54 when it was forced to address the constitutional chal-
lenge to the statute as an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.140 (2000).
48. 681 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). D.M. had been charged with sexually
assaulting his adopted daughter over the course of a number of years and had appar-
ently sought psychiatric help for his abusive behavior. Id. at 450. At trial, the victim
asked D.M. to produce his medical records, to which D.M. invoked the physician-
patient privilege. Id.
49. Id. at 451.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 451-52.
52. Id. at 451.
53. Id.
54. 745 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
[Vol. 70
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the Federal Constitution.55 The court rejected the challenge, noting -that the
legislature had a rational basis for enacting the statute,56 and restated that the
physician-patient privilege is statutory in origin and, thus, "has no constitu-
tional underpinning., 57 According to the court, the legislature chose to deal
with the serious problem of child abuse by not protecting privileged commu-
nications between doctors, psychologists, and licensed counselors and their
patients when the communications involve or pertain to child abuse or ne-
glect.58 The court prevented this issue from surfacing in the future by declar-
ing that the legislature acted within its power in abolishing the physician-
patient privilege in connection with child abuse and neglect cases.5 9
The Missouri Court of Appeals has continued to give deference to the
Missouri Supreme Court's judgments in Hoester and Ward since 1988, but
the appellate court tends to be more stringent in the statute's application to
cases that could involve child abuse.60 In State v. Ermatinger,61 42-year-old
Michael Ermatinger was convicted of second degree deviate sexual assault
after undressing his 16-year-old male victim and engaging in oral inter-
course. 62 Following the assault, the victim sought the help of a psychiatrist,
entered a mental hospital for psychiatric reasons, and attempted to commit
63suicide on at least one occasion. On appeal, Ermatinger argued that under
55. Id. at 669. Appellant contended that the statute "violate[d] the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it denied an evidentiary privi-
lege ordinarily extended to defendants" on other charges that appellant considered
equally serious. Id.
56. Id. at 670.
57. Id. Constitutional challenges to child abuse reporting statutes have not had
much success in a variety of contexts. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to
Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R. 4th 782, 791 (2004).
58. Ward, 745 S.W.2d at 670.
59. Id.
60. See generally Pilger v. Pilger, 972 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (father
was prevented from invoking the physician-patient privilege pursuant to the exception
under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 210.140 because there existed evidence of
child abuse and neglect); Roth v. Roth, 793 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the party may not invoke physician-patient privilege in any custody proceedings
involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect); In re S.J. v. V.F., 849 S.W.2d
608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the testimony of therapists, counselors, psy-
chiatrists, and other witnesses who evaluated the children and their parents, which
revealed repeated acts of abuse upon the children, was critical to determining the
children's best interests); Fierstein v. DePaul Health Center, 24 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that the exclusion of evidence under the statute was valid);
Daneshfar v. Sly, 953 S.W.2d 95, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the applicabil-
ity of the statute to patient-physician privilege).
61. 752 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
62. Id. at 345.
63. Id. at 346.
20051
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Missouri Revised Statutes Section 210.140, the victim's physician-patient
privilege never existed and that the victim had waived any privilege that may
have existed.64 After reviewing the supreme court's decision in Hoester, the
court of appeals held that the trial court properly refused to compel the victim
and his treating psychiatrist's testimony about the victim's treatment because
such evidence fell within the statutory physician-patient privilege.
65
C. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 455.220
As set forth in Section 455.220 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the re-
quirements that a shelter must satisfy to qualify for funding include those
mandating that the shelter:
(4) Provide residential service or facilities for children when ac-
companied by a parent, guardian, or custodian who is a victim of
domestic violence and who is receiving temporary residential ser-
vice at the shelter;
(5) Require persons employed by or volunteering services to the
shelter to maintain the confidentiality of any information that
would identify individuals served by the shelter and any informa-
tion or records that are directly related to the advocacy services
provided to such individuals;
(6) Prior to providing any advocacy services, inform individuals
served by the shelter of the nature and scope of the confidentiality
requirement in subdivision (5) of this subsection.66
Additionally, Section 455.220 requires that:
2. Any person employed by or volunteering services to a shelter for
victims of domestic violence shall be incompetent to testify con-
cerning any confidential information described in subdivision (5)
of subsection 1 of this section, unless the confidentiality require-
ment is waived in writing by the individual served by the shelter.67
In 2000, the Missouri General Assembly revised this statute and specifi-
cally noted that all individuals working or volunteering at a shelter are in-
64. Id. at 350.
65. Id.
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.220 (2000).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 70
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competent to testify regarding confidential information.68 In deciding Merri-




The Missouri Supreme Court received Hope House's appeal after the
69court of appeals denied Hope House's motion to quash the subpoena. Judge
Richard Teitelman, writing for the court, held that Hope House was not re-
quired to produce the statutorily protected information because the order de-
nying Hope House's motion to quash the subpoena violated the confidential-
ity requirements of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 454.220.7
0
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the severity of the
problem that domestic violence has become for many American women,
children and families. 7' The court went on to note that for many victims of
domestic violence, the choice of whether to stay in the abusive relationship or
leave is not an easy one, as the victims cannot be assured that the abuse will
72end if they leave the situation. For those women who run from their abusers,
their safety and the well-being of their children often depends on their ability
to keep their whereabouts secret from everyone, especially their abuser.73
This need for secrecy is the reason confidentiality statutes have been enacted
and is why they are vital to the safety of women and children residing in do-
mestic violence shelters.74
The court then discussed the Missouri statute requiring domestic vio-
lence shelters to maintain strict confidentiality as a means for ensuring safety
for their residents.75 The court began by explaining the five distinguishing
features of the confidentiality requirements, beginning with the need to pre-
vent the shelter from releasing any identifying information about the domestic
68. Brief for Relator at *15, State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133
S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (No. SC 85638).
69. State ex rel. Hoe House v. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d 44, 46 (Mo. 2004) (en
banc). This denial required Hope House to produce any and all material relating to
Maria Martinez, her children, and their stay at the shelter. Id.
70. Id. at 50.
71. Id. at 46-47. Although anyone can become a victim of domestic violence, the
United States Department of Justice has estimated that the majority of victims are
women, with at least two million women being severely abused by their partners each
year. Id. at 47.
72. Id. See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 77-78.
73. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 47.
74. Zorza, supra note 46, at 294.
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.220.1(5) (2000).
2005]
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violence victim.76 Functioning as a place of last resort for the victim, the shel-
ter plays an incredibly important role not only by shielding the victim's loca-
tion from the abuser, but also by ensuring the safety and security of other
shelter residents as well.77 Second, the shelter cannot disclose any informa-
tion regarding advocacy services it provides to victims. 78 The court reasoned
that the secrecy of these communications acts to encourage victims to leave
their abusers and seek refuge at a shelter, knowing that third parties will not
be informed about the abusive relationship.
79
The third feature of the confidentiality requirement provides that all
shelter employees and volunteers are covered by the requirement; an em-
ployee need not work directly with a victim for the confidentiality require-
ment to apply.80 The court approached the fourth feature as a clarification,
that, under the statute, the confidentiality requirement does not arise within
the context of a traditionally protected relationship, such as attorney-client,
but rather in circumstances where confidentiality is vital to protecting a per-
son from imminent threats of violence.8'
The final requirement discussed by the court deals with waiver of confi-
dentiality by the victim. 82 The shelter resident is strictly prohibited from
waiving confidentiality unless testimony is sought regarding the shelter's
records and information.8 3 The court concluded its discussion of Section
455.220 by noting that even where records and information are requested of
the shelter, the victim holds the ultimate choice as to whether or not she will
waive confidentiality. 84
76. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 47-48. Identifying information includes not just the
victim's name, but also former residences, places of employment, the abuser's iden-
tity, or the resident's physical description. Id.
77. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 48.
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.220.1(5) (2000)
79. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 48.
80. Id. The court explained that even someone serving the shelter as a volunteer
maintenance worker would be prohibited from divulging any information regarding a
resident at the shelter that the volunteer may or may not have seen. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.220.2 (2000). States do not all agree about whether
the victim is the only person who holds the ability to waive confidentiality.
California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming make clear that the battered woman is the sole holder of the
privilege. Alaska and North Dakota give the privilege both to the battered
woman and to those working at a domestic violence program. New Hamp-
shire and North Dakota protect the disclosure of a domestic violence shel-
ter's location by also prohibiting the battered woman from revealing it,
even if she so desires.
Zorza, supra note 46, at 298.
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The court next examined Missouri Revised Statutes Section 210.140 as
it relates to Section 455.220. 85 The court noted that the operative limitation on
Section 210.140 is that its application applies only to a legally recognized
"privileged communication" but that the statute does not define the parame-
ters of what a "privileged communication" may be.8 6 Using their decision in
State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin that a term will be given its plain meaning as
derived from the dictionary in absence of a statutory definition,8 7 the court
determined that a "privileged communication" is partially defined as a com-
munication that is "protected by law from forced disclosure. 8 8 Continuing
with its discussion of what constitutes a "privileged communication," the
court noted the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "privilege," which pro-
vides that a privilege is "[a]n evidentiary rule that gives a witness the option
not to disclose the fact asked for, even though it might be relevant . . .
esp[ecially] when the information was originally communicated in a profes-
sional or confidential relationship."89 The court then reasoned that the "privi-
leged communications" in Section 210.140 are evidentiary privileges; thus,
the statute does not establish a blanket rule of confidentiality.90
Using this definition of "privileged communication," the court con-
cluded that the Section 455.220 requirements are distinguishable from the
privileged communications of Section 210.140 in three important ways.91
First, the Section 455.220 requirements pertain to all shelter workers and
volunteers and are in place not to foster open communication but to ensure
the residents' safety.92 Second, the privileged communications in Section
210.140 have a very limited scope, whereas Section 455.220 applies to a wide
variety of forms and types of communication, including any information re-
garding the resident's identity.93 Finally, Section 455.220.2 does not allow for
the confidentiality requirements to be waived, except when the resident does
so after testimony has been requested. 94 The court concluded by holding that
the Section 210.140 limitations of privileged communications do not apply to
the confidentiality requirements of Section 455.220.95
85. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 48.
86. Id. at 49.
87. State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857-58 (Mo. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam).
88. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 49 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 273 (7th ed.
1999)).
89. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (7th ed. 1999)). Black's Law
Dictionary goes on to list physician-patient and husband-wife privileges as examples






95. Id. at 49-50.
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B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Limbaugh, in dissent, contended that Missouri Revised Statutes
Sections 455.220 and 210.140 are in conflict when applied to cases dealing
with a domestic violence shelter resident who is accused of child abuse or
neglect.96 Judge Limbaugh was troubled by the fact that Section 455.220 es-
tablishes a legally recognized privilege for communication, yet Section
210.140 does not allow any privilege to pertain to situations involving child
abuse or neglect. 97 His concern was compounded by the majority's failure to
reconcile these statutory differences. 98 Using Missouri Revised Statutes Sec-
tion 211.011 for its basis in ascertaining the legislative intent for enacting
both statutes, 99 Judge Limbaugh determined that children would be best
served by privileging all relevant testimony and other evidence that would
help protect children from continuing abuse.'00
Before concluding, Judge Limbaugh noted that he would only eliminate
the confidentiality requirement in limited circumstances where a parent is
being accused of child abuse or neglect.' 0 ' In light of the contradictory lan-
guage of Sections 210.140 and 455.220 and the public policy arguments for
protecting child victims of abuse and neglect, Judge Limbaugh would have
ordered Hope House to produce the requested information.
10 2
V. COMMENT
Institutional responses to family violence today are bifurcated into two
separate systems: the child protective services system and the domestic vio-
lence system.' 0 3 Both systems believe there is a clearly identifiable victim:
"the innocent child in need of protection in the child protective services sys-
96. Id. at 51. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). Judges Benton and Price concurred in
Judge Limbaugh's dissent.
97. Id. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
99. This section states: "The child welfare policy of this state is what is in the
best interests of the child." Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.011 (2000).
100. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 51 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). See also State v.
Ward, 745 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). Judge Limbaugh noted that, al-
though there would be some situations where a child would benefit from the confiden-
tiality provisions of Section 455.220 in terms of convincing a parent to seek refuge at
a domestic violence shelter from an abuser, the benefits would be significantly out-
weighed by the detriment caused to children when the parent residing at a shelter is
also abusing or neglecting the children. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 51. (Limbaugh, J.,
dissenting).
101. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 51. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 52 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
103. Mangold, supra note 37, at 104.
[Vol. 70
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss3/7
VICTIM CONFIDENTIALITY
tem and the battered wife in the domestic violence system."' 0 4 While both
systems seek to protect victims who are incapable of ensuring their own
safety, the law has tended to position the systems against each other in creat-
ing ways for each to help their victims.
As society becomes more aware of the pervasiveness of domestic vio-
lence, a growing consensus believes that children are harmed by witnessing
this abuse. 105 In one survey, 87% of battered women living with children said
they knew their children were aware of the abuse. 106 Researchers suggest that
"[t]hree to ten million children per year experience the psychological trauma
of seeing a parent beaten or otherwise assaulted."' 0 7 However, because the
amount of violence children witness and the circumstances surrounding the
experience will vary, the harm suffered will not be the same for every
child.'08
Unfortunately, children are not only indirect victims of domestic vio-
lence. The likelihood that a child will suffer physical abuse increases when a
parent is abused, because battered mothers are more likely to abuse their chil-
dren, and fathers who beat their wives will frequently abuse their children as
well. 19 A study of the estimated incidents of child maltreatment in the United
States, including cases not reported to authorities, concluded that over one
and a half million children a year suffer harm from abuse or neglect at the
hands of parents or caretakers. 10 Thus, the need to protect children from con-
tributing to these statistics is great. The Missouri General Assembly demon-
104. Id.
105. Linda Spears, Building Bridges Between Domestic Violence Organizations
and Child Protective Services, Violence Against Women Online Resources (last re-
vised February 2000) at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/dvcps/dvcps.html. See
also Kim Aheam et al., Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still
Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000).
106. Mangold, supra note 37, at 107.
107. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, AM. PROSECUTORS
RESEARCH INST., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 6 (3d ed. 2004),
citing P. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN (1990). See also Davidson,
supra note 37, at 188.
108. Spears, supra note 105.
109. NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, AM. PROSECUTORS
RESEARCH INST., supra note 107, at 7, citing M. STRAUS & R. GELLES, PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1990) (finding that mothers beaten by their part-
ners are twice as likely to abuse their children); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at
152, citing Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Woman Battering, Child Abuse and Social
Heredity: What is the Relationship? in MARITAL VIOLENCE (Norman Johnson, ed.
1985).
110. Davidson, supra note 37, at 188. An estimated three million children each
year are abused, and more than one million children are actually found to be abused
or neglected each year. Id.
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strated its awareness of this need by enacting Missouri Revised Statutes Sec-
tion 210.140."'
The asserted goal of the domestic violence system is to empower
women. Unfortunately these women are all too often pitted against the child
protective system in a purported effort to protect children." 2 When a battered
woman with children attempts to end an abusive situation, she faces many
problems that lack clear solutions. First, she must decide how to best protect
herself and her children from her abuser." 3 If she decides to leave her abuser,
the mother then must determine how she will obtain housing and money to
feed her children." 4 Thus the battered mother has to make serious decisions
about her own welfare and means for survival as well as the well being of her
children.
In Merrigan, the Missouri Supreme Court faced a situation with which it
had never dealt when asked to harmonize conflicting statutes dealing with
child welfare and victim confidentiality. But the importance of Merrigan goes
further than just a synchronization of statutes - it provides Missouri's domes-
tic violence shelters with clear guidance regarding the requirements for main-
taining victim confidentiality when faced with demands for victim records." 15
Hope House argued that the conflicting state and federal laws about confiden-
tiality left shelters virtually stuck between a rock and a hard place in ensuring
compliance with all state and federal regulations. 16 Since federal117 and
state' 18 laws required Hope House to maintain victim confidentiality in order
to receive substantial amounts of state and federal funding, the shelter's abil-
ity to serve domestic violence victims and their children would be severely
compromised if the shelter violated the confidentiality requirements. 19 How-
ever, had the court not issued the writ of prohibition, based on the supreme
11l. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.140 (Supp. 2001).
112. Mangold, supra note 37 at 73.
113. Collins, supra note 3, at 751-52.
114. Id. at 752. Battered women clearly face great economic, social and safety
hurdles when attempting to leave a violent partner. Susan Schechter & Jeffrey L.
Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call for Collaboration Be-
tween Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, Minnesota Center
Against Violence and Abuse (1994), available at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html.
115. See Emily Umbright, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CENTERS RETAIN
CONFIDENTIALITY RIGHT, St. Louis Daily Record and St. Louis Countian (April 15,
2004).
116. Brief for Relator at *13-14, State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133
S.W.3d 44 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (No. SC 85638), citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 10604(d)
(2004) and Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 455.215,455.220 (2000)).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 10604(d) (2000).
118. Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.220 (2000).
119. Brief for Relator at * 13.
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court's previous decisions regarding Section 210.140,120 Hope House would
have been forced to violate these laws to comply with the subpoena and pro-
vide confidential records without Martinez's consent.121 Thus, the court was
faced with a decision that had the potential to adversely affect victims of
child abuse or neglect regardless of the decision reached.
In his dissent, Judge Limbaugh stated his belief that the public policy
benefit to children of requiring disclosure of victims' records outweighs the
detriment to shelter residents.' 22 While children may indeed benefit from full
discovery of shelter records that could reveal evidence of abuse and neglect,
the potential for harm to both the domestic violence victim and her children
could be even greater once the abuser discovers that the family's secrets have
been revealed. Many women are discouraged from even entering shelters
with their children for fear that their children will be taken from their custody
if any kind of abuse is discovered. 23 For example, in Massachusetts, the De-
partment of Social Services found that when child protective workers identi-
fied domestic violence in the home, their discovery resulted in an increase in
child abuse reports and a decrease in the number of battered women seeking
services. 124 The best solution to help these battered mothers and their children
is through increased collaboration and coordination between child protection
services and women's advocate services and shelters.
2 5
In the face of evidence suggesting the need for disclosure of victims' re-
cords to investigate child abuse and neglect cases, the court was able to find a
way to justify its position in allowing Hope House to keep Martinez's records
confidential without violating Missouri Revised Statutes Section 210.140.126
120. See generally supra notes 47-53, 60-65 and accompanying text; State v.
Eisenhouer, 40 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (declining to decide the consti-
tutionality of the statute).
121. Brief for Relator at *14.
122. State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Mo. 2004)
(en banc) (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
123. Collins, supra note 3, at 750.
124. Id. See also Aheam et al., supra note 105, at 857-58.
125. Collins, supra note 3, at 752.
126. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d at 50. The supreme court's ability to reconcile both of
these statutes allows employees and volunteers in Missouri shelters to breathe a little
easier, but this is not the case around the county. Shelters nationwide continue to
argue with state and federal government agencies about the need to keep resident
information confidential. See Mackenzie Carpenter, Local Shelter to Give Up Fund-
ing Rather Than Turn Over Data on Abuse Victims, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE
(October 8, 2004) (discussing one shelter's decision not to violate state and federal
laws requiring strict confidentiality in the face of the U.S. Department of Housing and
Regulation's new requirements mandating the disclosure of information to track the
number of homeless people using government services); Shelters Forfeit Federal
Funds to Maintain Anonymity for Clients, CHILDREN AND YOUTH FUNDING REPORT
(April 28, 2005) (noting that many shelters across the country are choosing to forgo
2005]
15
Parsonage: Parsonage: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
In doing so, the Missouri Supreme Court created a landmark ruling that will
be the foundation on which shelters and child protective services can build
the idea that in supporting the mother's ability to maintain her confidentiality
rights, the child's best interests are met as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child abuse and neglect will continue to be a major problem in Ameri-
can society as long as action is not taken to prevent domestic violence in the
family. To provide safety for battered women and for their abused and ne-
glected children, society must continue to create a shared agenda of combat-
ing these problems as one cohesive issue. 12 7 In Merrigan, the Missouri Su-
preme Court took the first step in attempting to harmonize current statutes so
that both battered mothers and their children are adequately protected from
further abuse. With the continued support of the Missouri Supreme Court and
Missouri General Assembly, laws providing for an environment where vic-
tims and their children are safe and protected from their abusers should en-
able more victims of domestic violence to flee their abusive situations. Al-
lowing shelter workers to maintain the high confidentiality requirements of
state and federal laws is a step in the right direction not only for Missouri
domestic violence shelters,' 28 but for all the victims who begin new lives
within them.
LAUREN E. PARSONAGE
receiving federal funds by opting out of the homelessness data-gathering system to
protect shelter residents).
127. Spears, supra note 105.
128. See Umbright, supra note 115.
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